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This document consists of 1 page.

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MEMORANDUM

TO: G/PM - Mr. Jeffrey C. Kitcher

FROM: G/PM - Seymour Weiss

SUBJECT: Berlin

1. There is to be a White House meeting late this afternoon to decide what to do about the latest Friedrichstrasse border-closing incident. My guess as to probable action: nothing.

3. I have attached two documents in the Berlin Task Force series which, I think, you will find of interest. (Incidentally, the flow of paper produced by the Task Force is staggering and I have taken it upon myself not to forward to you 99% of it.) The first, Tab A, presents a current intelligence assessment of Soviet intentions, this being a continuation of the project which Alex launched at our suggestion some time ago. The assessment of Soviet intentions on page 2 is interesting. The second document, Tab B, gives some indication of the direction in which the European Security Study is moving.

Attachments:

- (A) Memo re Assessment of Current Soviet Intentions in the Berlin Crisis: Oct. 17-24
- (B) Memo re European Security and Surprise Attack

G/PM: Weiss:pp

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- 2 -

Czechoslovakia followed Moscow's example of extending the tours of duty for some troops. (Belgium, West Germany, Hungary, and Poland have already done the same.)

The lull in the Warsaw Pact maneuvers continues. So far no evidence has appeared that the expected large-scale ground maneuvers are imminent. The bulk of the Polish units present in the GDR earlier this month have been withdrawn.

Each publicized action in the Western military buildup is reported by Moscow, but with little comment. However, the general idea of the Western military buildup continues to be played up in bloc apologetics on the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing.

Berlin and Germany. Soviet handling of the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint incidents (in which US cars whose occupants in civilian clothes refused to show ID cards went through with military escorts) seemed to show a desire to improve relations with the US on the Berlin scene, or at least stem further deterioration. However, whether this initial response represented the final Communist position remained to be seen.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

Khrushchev's relatively moderate statements on Berlin and Germany once again indicate Moscow is eager to negotiate and hopes to achieve its ends through negotiations. Khrushchev's aim seemed to be to encourage a climate for negotiations, without giving the appearance of weakness or overwillingness to ease his demands.

Khrushchev's speech will probably set the tone and manner of the Soviet approach to the Berlin problem in the near future. This does not mean, however, that Moscow will refrain from threatening language and gestures when it deems these necessary to back up the convening of negotiations or to improve its negotiating posture.

Barring a quick Soviet victory over the Albanians and Chinese, Moscow will be preoccupied with intra-bloc quarrels in the weeks to come. This preoccupation may divert its attention away from East-West issues. The Soviets will not relent in pressing the Berlin issue, but they may be willing to settle for less than they would have before.

Viewed in perspective, the CPSU Congress seems likely to produce a shift in Soviet foreign policy in the direction of a more flexible, less militant approach than has been the case in recent months. Whether this will have any effect on the immediate question of Berlin remains to be seen; there is certainly no suggestion of compromise on basic issues.

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European Security and Surprise Attack

Following is a list of points concerning the subject, which appear to report a consensus of the points which have been agreed for testing in the Quadripaste Study group on October 26. Primary considerations relating to each point are set forth briefly.

This paper is circled as a basis for further study within the U.S. element of the Study Group.

1962-11 / Dr. L. J. L. L. L.

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1.2 (b)(1), 3 (b)
(5) (5)

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5. Measures to Reduce the Dangers of Surprise Attack and
Accidental War.

Following have been suggested: inspection zones, advance notification of major military movements or activities, exchange of military missions.

These proposals are not designed to limit forces or weapons as such, or inhibit their deployment. On the positive side, they could "help off" preparation for massive ground surprise; could tend to blow down secrecy and reduce tensions; could be "trial-run" for techniques and measures to be later employed in development of air control and disarmament programs.

On the negative side looms the problem of discrimination if the proposals relate only to Europe, or more particularly West Germany. Inspected inspection zones offer little protection.

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-3-

events taking place in the situation. In general, measures of this sort could lead to a false sense of security, and in the negotiations the Soviets would likely push toward disarmament, denuclearization, etc. In any event, inspection should cover all labels - ground, sea and air and West on board Korea. Experience should not expect to risk too much.

It is suggested that the U.S. be prepared to have proposals for measures that are applicable to areas other than Europe, preferably the U.S. and the USSR themselves.

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